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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
E YEN ODDS, INC., I' 
Plaintiff-Appellant. 
Case No. 
vs. ~ 10814 
~IILTON C. NIELSON, 
Defendrmt-llespundcnt. 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff asserts that the defendant violated 
certain provisions of a mining lease with respect to 
mining properties in San Juan County, and that as a 
result of such breaches, plaintiff is entitled to recover 
damages ( 1) for breach of contract; ( 2) for unlawful 
mining and removing of certain ores from the mme; 
and ( 3) for unlawful detainer of the mine. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
District Judge A. II. Ellett heard testimony and 
received other evidence for five days and after some-
1 
what brief oral argument at the conclusion of the trial, 
gave counsel 30 days each within which to submit 
written briefs. Prior to the time that the briefs were 
to be submitted, Judge Ellett was appointed to the 
State Supreme Court. Upon instruction by the Judge, 
the Clerk of the court entered a judgment in favor of 
the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of 
$9,000.00, but there was no opportunity afforded for 
preparation or consideration of Findings of Fact or 
Conclusions of Law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant asks this court to enter orders 
and make determinations appropriate to accomplish 
the fallowing results: 
A. Determining and adjudicating that the dam-
ages awarded to the plaintiff were inadequate as a 
matter of law on the plaintiff's cause of action assert-
ing a breach of contract (The First Cause of Action 
in No. 2714) and that plaintiff is entitled to damages 
m the sum of $29,188.53. 
B. Determining and adjudicating that the plain-
tiff is entitled to recover on its cause of action asserting 
that the defendant was guilty of unlawfully mining and 
removing valuable ores from the Pete mine (The Sec-
ond Cause of Action in No. 2714) and is entitled to 
recover damages in the sum of $73,319.89, trebled, under 
40-1-12 UCA 1953. 
2 
C. Determining and adjudicating that plaintiff is 
entitled to recover substantial damages as a result of 
defendant's unlawful detainer of the Pete mine from 
April I, 1966 until December 16, 1966, and that the 
amount of damages sustained is $1,045.00 per month. 
D. Determining and adjudicating that plaintiff is 
entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee. 
In the event this court determnes that the plain-
tiff is entitled to substantial damages and that the 
amount awarded by the trial court is inadequate as 
a matter of law but is unable to make any determination 
()f damages from the evidence in the record, plaintiff 
moves the court for the appointment of a master for 
the determination of the amount of damages on each 
of plaintiff's claims. 
STATE.MENT OF FACTS 
On the 1st day of April, 1963, the parties executed 
a mining lease upon certain unpatented mining claims 
in San Juan County ref erred to for convenience as the 
"Pete Claims". Paragraph 4 of that lease (Ex. A 
to Complaint, 2715) provides as fallows: 
"4. Rights of Lessee. The Lessee shall have 
the right and privilege during the term of this 
agreement to conduct exploratory drilling, mining 
and metallurgical operations on the mining prop-
erties subject to this agreement and to extract, 
produce, remove, process and ship or otherwise 
3 
dispose of ores, minerals and mineral products, 
provided nevertheless, that the maximum dimen-
sions of any drift cut, drilled or made by the 
Lessee which is necessary as a haulage way shall 
not exceed a distance of 10 feet wide and 10 feet 
high. Lessee shall have the right to make cross 
cuts, provided that pillars shall be left standing 
not less than 20 feet square or equivalent. Lessee 
expressly covenants and agrees that he shall con-
duct or suffer to be conducted no stoping or 
stripping on said mining properties without the 
written consent of Lessor. Said practices shall be 
applicable to any and all underground mining 
on said property, but shall not be applicable to 
open pit mining thereon. Failure to comply with 
the terms of this paragraph shall constitute justi-
fication to the Lessor to cancel this lease without 
notice to Lessee." 
The undisputed evidence was that Paragraph 4 of the 
1963 Lease was identical to Paragraph 4 of prior min-
ing leases executed by the same parties upon the same 
property in 1960 and 1962 (See Para. 4 of Exs. 12 
and 14). The original lease between the parties was 
prepared by Robert Anderson, one of the attorneys for 
the defendant in the instant litigation (Tr. 166). The 
draft submitted to the defendant, from which the origi-
nal lease was substantially copied, provided that the 
drifts would be limited in size to 8 feet by 8 feet, and 
that the pillars would be 40 feet square (Tr. 167). 
The provisions of Paragraph 4 of the draft were 
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changed at the defendant's request to prescribe the 
size of the drifts to be 10 feet by 10 feet, and the size 
of the pillars to be 20 feet square (Tr. 167). The 
evidence is uncontroverted that the purpose of these 
jJrovisions was to limit the ore which the defendant 
could remove from the mine. In ordinary mining 
practice involving uranium 85% to 90% recovery of 
the ore is considered good recovery without any mining 
restrictions. The restrictions of Paragraph 4 of the 
Lease in the instant litigation would permit the Lessee 
to recover from 60% to 65% of the ore without violat-
ing the provisions of the paragraph (Tr. 146). 
The principal officers and directors of the plain-
tiff corporation were James L. Menlove, an engineer 
who resided in Bountiful (Tr. 14) and Melvin K. 
Dalton, whose business interests were primarily in 
livestock and cattle. Mr. Dalton resided at :Monticello 
(Tr. 161, 162). As a result of past experience in their 
dealings with the defendant, and particularly in view 
of their interest in other business ventures, neither 
.Jlr. Menlove nor Mr. Dalton had any occasion to visit 
the Pete mine for a period of ·at least a year prior to 
the early Spring of 1966 (Tr. 23, 174). Mr. Dalton 
and Mr. Menlove both testified that while they had 
told l\Ir. Nielson upon various occasions that his opera-
tions were borderline in some instances; that his drifts 
were too wide; that the pillars were slightly too small 
(Tr. 99, 100, 104, 105, 106), his operations were sub-
stantially in compliance with the requirements of Para-
5 
graph 4, until the conduct which resulted in this law-
suit (Tr. 24, 72, 113, 17 4). 
In the early Spring of 1966, fallowing a v1s1t to 
the mine by l\1r. Dalton, the property was examined 
by both Dalton and Menlove. It was obvious that 
since their last visit the defendant had mined out large 
rooms in the Pete mine. He had stoped and stripped 
the property, and the drifts, cross-cuts and pillars 
all substantially violated the provisions of Paragraph 
4 (Tr. 108, see the photographs in evidence as Ex-
hibits 13-21). Plaintiff gave defendant notice to quit 
the premises (Tr. 106, 107) . Notwithstanding such 
notice, Mr. Nielson shipped $11,269.97 worth of ore 
during April of 1966 (Settlement sheet dated May 2, 
1966, 1st sheet of Ex. 7; the figure includes haulage al-
lowance of $3,444.05). He then ceased his mining 
operations but refused to release or deliver the premises 
to the plaintiff. After attempting to get trial settings 
during the Summer of 1966, the plaintiff finally suc-
ceeded in getting a hearing on the merits in December. 
The testimony at the trial was to a substantial 
extent uncontroverted. The plaintiff's evidence con-
sisted of descriptions by witnesses of the conditions 
of the mined area and evidence of damage. Plaintiff 
proved, through James Menlove, who was an experi-
enced engineer with operating experience in mining, 
the tonnage of ore removed from the mine in violation 
of Paragraph 4. Shipping records and settlement sheets 
were introduced to prove the average value of the ore 
6 
removed, and using a conversion factor of 17 cubic 
foot per ton and the calculations of the average value 
per ton of the ore shipped, plaintiff demonstrated the 
actual market value in place of the ore taken from the 
mine by the defendant in violation of the agreement. 
Samuel Arentz, a highly qualified mining engineer 
from Salt Lake City, testified concerning the areas 
from which the ore was removed in violation of the 
terms of Paragraph 4, the value of the ore in place, 
the cost of the removal of the ore wrongfully shipped 
by the defendant, and the amount of profit which the 
plaintiff would have made on the ore if it had been 
left in place according to the provisions of the para-
graph. There was a slight variation in the results com-
puted by Mr. Menlove and Mr. Arentz. For the pur-
poses of this appeal, it is assumed that the evidence 
least favorable to the appellant would be used in making 
the appropriate computations. On this basis, a sum-
mary of the evidence is as fallows: 
Tonnage wrongfully removed ------------ 3,031 tons 
Average grade of ore-.2384 % U308 
@ $19.35 piton (haulage not included) $58,649.85 
Cost of removal of tonnage wrong-
fully removed @ $6.75 piton ____________ 20,459.25 
Net value of ore ~rongfully removed ____ $38,190.60 
Royalties paid on tonnage removed 
@ $2.97 piton x 3,031 tons ______________ 9,002.07 
Even Odds, Inc., damage for ore 
wrongfully removed ---------------------------- 29,188.54 
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A brief explanation is required with respect to 
these figures. Samuel Arentz testified that 3,398 tons 
of ore were wrongfully removed (Tr. 120-124, Ex. 
25). He testified that his calculations and tabulations 
were made with reasonable engineering certainty and 
in accordance with generally accepted engineering prin-
ciples (Tr. 137). Judge Ellett indicated, in the course 
of the trial, that he believed that the tonnage in Area 
1 in the ceiling of the normal 10 foot x 10 foot drift 
should not be allowed as damage, because Melvin 
Dalton told the defendant sometime during 1965 to 
determine the thickness of the ore in this area. The 
judge believed that defendant was led to believe he 
could mine the ore above the drift (Tr. 393). It ap· 
pears from the exhibits that a volume of ore seven feet 
high, 10 feet wide and 65 feet long, or 4550 cubic feet, 
would have been disallowed on this theory. At 17 cubic 
feet per ton, therefore, 267 tons should have been re-
duced from .Mr. Arentz's calculations, leaving 3,031 
tons of ore wrongfully removed. It is to be observed 
that neither the defendant nor his expert witness, 
Elbert E. Lewis, a mining engineer from Grand Junc-
tion, Colorado, challenged the accuracy of the Arentz 
figures. In fact, Lewis admitted that he and a civil 
engineer whose testimony was not offered checked the 
accuracy of plaintiff's maps and found them to be sub-
stantially accurate (Tr. 312). 
The average grade of ore taken from the mine 
during the period in question is ascertainable from the 
settlement sheets in evidence as Exhibits 7 and 15. 
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The average value per ton is ascertainable from the 
:-iame documents. There c.:an be no quarrel with the fact 
that the average grade of U30S is .2384%, and the 
ayerage value per ton during the period under con-
~;deration is $19.35. The value per ton times the num-
ber of tons wrongfully removed is simply a mathe-
matical calculation. 
~Ir. Arentz testified that he would estimate that 
if the provisions of Paragraph 4 had been observed, 
the cost of removal of the remaining ore would have 
been $6.75 per ton (Tr. 129). l\fr. Menlove estimated 
the cost at $6.00 per ton (Tr. 42). The defendant 
testified that the cost of runnning an eight-foot drift 
was only $4.00 per ton. Obviously the cost of removal 
of ore when a drift is already in existence would be 
substantially less. The removal cost of $6. 7 5 per ton, 
therefore, is substantially more favorable to the de-
fendant than any other figure in the record on this 
phase of the case. The cost per ton times the number 
of tons wrongfully removed is a mathematical calcu-
lation. 
It is conceded that the plaintiff was paid an average 
royalty of $2.97 per ton on the ore shipped prior to 
April, 1966. Actually, no royalty has been received 
by the plaintiff at this time for the tonnage shipped 
by the defendant after he was given notice to quit the 
premises. Even so, in its computation of damages 
plaintiff-appellant has applied the average royalty to 
all of the tonnage in question. Once again, the figure 
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used is conservative, and the defendant cannot have 
any reasonable objection to its use. 
It is important to observe that the only figure 
used about which there could have been any possible 
argument is the number of tons wrongfully removed. 
The defendant did not purport to off er any evidence 
on this point. The only evidence concerning damage~ 
offered by defendant was with respect to a legal theory 
which the appellant believes was not applicable to 
the case. This matter is discussed more fully at pages 
17 et. seq. of the brief. 
Plaintiff proved that the gross value of the ore 
unlawfully removed, without regard to the costs of 
mining or the costs of shipping, was $73,319.89. There 
was no dispute that if plaintiff's recovery under the 
tort theory was limited to the amount of ore removed 
after defendant received the notice to quit the premises, 
that it should recover approximately $11,269.97. In 
other words, it was undisputed that after receiving the 
notice to quit, the defendant removed $11,267.97 worth 
of ore, represented by a settlement sheet dated May 2, 
1966 and in evidence as the first sheet of Exhibit 7. 
The plaintiff proved that the mine had been op-
erated by a number of persons beginning with Ran-
wick, Ltd., a Canadian corporation, between 1959 and 
the time of the trial.The mine had produced approxi-
mately one million dollars wqrth of ore (Tr. 371, 372). 
Defendant's expert witness conceded that the mme 
appeared to be capable of additional production. De-
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feuJant's counsel stipulated, in fact, that mineable ore 
is left in the mine (Tr. 320). Plaintiff received $76,-
:WO. 78 over the period covered by the Nielson leases 
as rentals or royalties (Tr. 137, 138). Since Nielson's 
operations covered the period from February 24, 1900 
(Exhibit 12) to l\Iarch 30, 1966, a period of 73 months, 
'.t is certainly reasonable to believe that the right to 
the possession of the mine was worth at least $1,045.00 
per month, or stated conversely, that plaintiff was 
damaged in the amount of $1,045.00 per month by 
reason of defendant's unlawful detainer from :'.\larch 
:JO to December 16. 
It \Vas undisputed that the defendant's operations 
constituted a violation of Paragraph 4 of the lease upon 
the Pete claims. It was also uncontradicted that the 
defendant did not perform the work requirements 
contained in the lease upon the Lee claims and the 
School Section. While the trial court did not make 
any Finding of Fact or Conclusions of Law, the J udg-
ment entered at his direction is conclusive that the 
trial judge found that the defendant was in default 
under both leases and that the plaintiff was entitled 
to recover damages at least for breach of contract 
(Tr. 393). Judge Ellett indicated at the conclusion 
of the evidence that it was his view at that time that 
the plaintiff could not recover under the Second Cause 
of Action in No. 2714. The appellant assumes in this 
brief, therefore, that the court ruled against the plain-
tiff on the theory that the defendant wrongfully ex-
tracted and carried away ore from the Pete mine. The 
11 
court stated at the time of oral argument that it was 
of the view that the defendant was guilty of unlawful 
detainer of the Pete mine between approximately 
April l, 1966 and the time of the trial, but that plai11 • 
tiff was entitled to be awarded only nominal damages. 
Plaintiff assumes that such theory prevailed when the 
judgment was entered. 
Plaintiff appeals upon four grounds: 
( l) Based upon the undispued evidence and 
as a matter of law, plaintiff was entitled to recover 
a substantially greater amount of damages for 
breach of contract than the sum awarded by the 
trial court. The trial judge applied an improper 
theory of damage for breach of contract. 
( 2) On the undisputed evidence and as a 
matter of law plaintiff was entitled to recoYer 
under the Second Cause of Action in Civil No. 
2714, i.e., it is undisputed that the defendant 
wrmigf ully and willfully extracted and carried 
away from the Pete mine certain ore and that the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover three times the value 
of such ore without respect to deductions for labor 
bestowed or expenses incurred in removing, trans-
porting, selling, or preparing said ore for market 
under the provisions of Section 40-1-12 of the 
Utah Code. 
( 3) Plaintiff is entitled to recover substantial 
damages for unlawful detainer of the Pete mine 
between April l, 1966 and December 16, 1966, 
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the amount of such damages to be based upon the 
opera ting experience of the mine and the amount 
which plaintiff received as rentals or royalties 
during the period when it had possession of the 
property. 
( 4) Under the contract, plaintiff is entitled 
to attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AMOUNT OF DA.MAGES A'VARD-
ED TO PLAINTIFF ON THE BREACH OF 
CONTRACT THEORY 'VAS INADEQUATE 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The First Cause of Action in No. 2714 asserts the 
propositon that defendant violated the provisions of 
Paragraph 4 of the mining lease upon the Pete claims 
dated April 1, 1963. The lease clearly and unequivo-
cally provides that "the maximum dimensions of any 
drift cut, drilled or made by the lessee which is necessary 
as a haulage way shall not exceed a distance ten feet 
wide and ten feet high. Lessee shall have the right to 
make cross-cuts provided that pillars shall be left stand-
ing not less than 20 ft. square or equivalent. Lessee 
expressly covenants and agrees that he shall conduct 
or suffer to be conducted no stoping or stripping on 
said mining properties without the written consent of 
Lessor." 
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The material provisions of the lease are unambigu. 
ous. The breaches by the defendant were undisputed: 
the evidence concerning the proper measure of damage~ 
was undisputed. The error committed by the trial 
judge was that he applied the measure of damage~ 
applicable in condemnation cases rather than the mea~­
ure of damages properly applicable to breach of con. 
tract. 
The evidence showed that defendant's violation vi 
the provisions of Paragraph 4 were willful. The de-
fendant Milton C. Nielson was an experienced miner 
He admitted that he had engaged in mining operations 
for 15 years and he described in some detail the experi-
ence he had obtained in various mines in the Four Cor-
ners area (Tr. 194-195) . Prior to the time that he 
entered into his first lease upon the Pete claims in 
1960, he made a number of trips to the mine and made 
a detailed examinaton of the drifts, pillars and the 
kind of mining operation that had theretofore been 
conducted (Tr. 196-198) . lVIelvin Dalton, the Secre-
tary of the plaintiff corporation and one of its director~, 
submitted to the defendant a form of lease which had 
been used in a prior transaction between the plaintiff 
and Mikesell and .Mahon (Tr. 165, 203). The Mikesell-
Mahon lease contained a paragraph very similar to 
Paragraph 4 of the lease in question. The Mikesell-
Mahon lease was taken to Robert Anderson, one of 
the attorneys for the defendant in the instant case, and 
various suggestions were made by the defendant with 
respect to changes. The defendant admitted that terms 
14 
1rere <liscusse<l in l\Ir. An<lerson' s off ice (Tr. :lO:l) . 
'i'l1e record is uncontradicted that Paragraph 4 of the 
UHill lease between plaintiff and defendant differed 
from the .l\Iikesell-Mahon lease in that the latter re-
stricted the size of the drift to 8 x 8 ft. an<l required 
.tO or 50 ft. pillars; whereas the lease signed allowed 
10 ft. <lrifts and provided that the pillars should be 
:W ft. square. These changes were made at defendant's 
request (Tr. 167; cf para. 4, Exhibit 12). A new 
lease under which the litigation arose was executed on 
April 1, 1963. Paragraph 4 of these leases is identical. 
There were certain adjustments and modifications 
,11 the provisions with respect to the amount of royalty 
;,, be paid in the 1962 and 1963 leases. At no time, 
bebveen the 1960 lease and the spring of 1966, however, 
did the defendant suggest any change in Paragraph 4 
or indicate to the plaintiff in any way that its provisions 
were onerous or that he could not comply with them 
(Tr. 194). 
The defendant was in substantial compliance with 
the provisions of the lease, including Paragraph 4, 
until approximately one year prior to February of 
1966. l\lelvin Dalton testified that he last examined 
the mine a year or more prior to February, 1966, and 
at that time he walked. through the mine and did not 
observe any mining practices that would substantially 
<:ontradict Paragraph 4 (Tr. 174, 175). Both Melvin 
Dalton and James Menlove testified that mining opera-
tions through the period of their last visits were in 
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substantial compliance with the lease. The record is 
uncontradicted that defendant was furnished with 
copies of mining maps from the time he began opera-
tions until at least of spring of 1963 (Tr. 17). A map 
furnished to defendant in approximately the spring 
of 1963 (Tr. 17, Ex. 2) clearly indicates that mining 
operations at that time were in substantial compliance. 
In February, 1966, Melvin Dalton visited the mine for 
the first time in more than twelve months. He was 
accompanied by a Bob Hughes (Tr. 177). He observed 
substantial violations in newly mined portions of the 
property as shown an areas 1, 2, 3 and 4 of plaintiff's 
Exhibits 4, 13 and 24 (Tr. 177-178). Mr. Menlove, 
the President of the corporation, visited the mine 
shortly thereafter. The defendant was served with a 
Notice to Quit the property on or about March 30. 
1966. 
It is undisputed that the defendant's mining 
operations subsequent to the last visit to the property 
by plaintiff's officers constituted a violation of Para· 
graph 4. The areas marked in green on plaintiff's 
Exhibits 13 and 24 represent areas from which ore 
was removed as a result of stoping or stripping or 
failure to leave pillars 20 ft. square or equivalent or 
removal of ore from drifts or cross-cuts leaving such 
passageways greater than the permitted 10 x 10 ft. 
dimensions. The defendant himself testified that his 
mining operations proceeded substantially in accordance 
with the numerical sequence appearing on defendant's 
Exhibit 30. The defendant's expert did not attempt 
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to refute plaintiff's evidence to the effect that the lease 
was violated in the particulars plaintiff claimed. All 
of the mining in the area following No. 171 on Exhibit 
;JO necessarily occurred after either James Menlove or 
Melvin Dalton examined the mine. It is readily ap-
parent from the exhibit that all or substantially all of 
the violations are in areas with numbers greater than 
171, and, on defendant's own admissions, the mining had 
occurred after plaintiff's officers had inspected the 
property. 
The court stated unequivocally that he was per-
suaded that the defendant violated the contract (Tr. 
292-293). He stated that he believed the appropriate 
measure of damages, however, was reflected in the 
opinion of this court in State v. Noble ( 1959) 8 Ut. 
2nd 405, 335 P. (2d) 831, (1957) 6 Ut. (2d) 40, 305 
P. (2d) 495, a case involving condemnation of a gravel 
pit (Tr. 394) . Although Judge Ellett did not cite the 
case by name, it is clear from the judge's comments 
that he was relying upon the Noble case in reaching his 
conclusion. The court indicated at an earlier stage of 
the trial that his concept of the damage was the differ-
ence between the amount the purchaser would have 
paid for the mine before the breach of contract and 
afterwards (Tr. 323, 324) . In fact, plaintiff had rested, 
based upon the evide:r;i.ce demonstrating the measure 
nf damages under the contract concept, when the court 
indicated that he believed that principle was not applic-
able (Tr. 323-325). Thereupon, plaintiff's counsel 
offered to recall an expert witness to testify with re-
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spect to the amount of damage under the trial court's 
theory (Tr. 326-327) . 
After receiving additional evidence under the 
theory of State v. Noble, the trial court observed that 
there was a substantial difference in the testimony run-
ning from $5,000 to $45,000 from the expert witnesses 
(Tr. 394). He reiterated his position, that the dam-
ages to be awarded were by application of State v. 
Noble rather than the cases involving breach of con-
tract (Tr. 394). Appellant respectfully submits that 
the trial court's theory of damages was erroneous. The 
damages recoverable under the contract theory were 
uncontradicted. Using the evidence least favorable to 
plaintiff, plaintiff is entitled to recover the sum of 
$29,188.53, if the proper theory is applied. 
The basic policy in awarding damages for a breach 
of contract is expressed in McCormick on Damages, 
Sec. 137, at 561 ( 1935) : 
"In the case of a breach of contract, the goal 
of compensation is not the mere restoration to 
a former position, as in a tort, but the awarding 
of a sum which is the equivalent of performance 
of the bargain-the attempt to place the plain-
tiff in the position he would be in if the contract 
had been fulfilled." 
This was clearly stated to law of Utah by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah in Park v. Moorman Mfg. 
Co., (1952) 121 Ut. 339, 241 P.2d 914. See also Simp-
son on Contracts, Sec. 195, at 392 (2d Ed. 1965); 
Restatement on Contracts, Sec. 329. State v. Noble, 
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(1957) 6 Ut. 2d 40, 305 P.2d 495, (1959) 8 Ut. 405, 
;335 P.2d 831, was a condemnation case. The case 
relied upon by Judge Ellett does not support his appli-
cation. In the first opinion, 6 Ut. 2d 40, 305 P.2d 495, 
this court reversed the trial court which had permitted 
the damages to be calculated for the condemnation of 
all the defendant's land on the basis of totaling the 
values of individual parts of it. The court stated that 
proper measure of damages in condemnation was the 
fair market value of the whole tract of land as it would 
be sold to a willing buyer by a willing seller. The basic 
theory was clearly expressed to be that the value of 
individual parts, including minerals, were not to be 
considered separately, but rather the value of the con-
demned parcel as a whole was controlling. This theory 
is inappropriate for measuring damages where the 
wrongdoing consists of a breach of contract and the 
personal property removed in violation of the agree-
ment had a separate, easily established value, distinct 
from the value of the land as such. 
In Cleary v. Shand, ( 1916) 48 Ut. 640, 161 Pac. 
453, the court stated: 
"Where the destruction is a permanent injury 
to land, it may be that damages may be meas-
ured and ascertained by showing the value of 
the land before and after the destruction . . . 
(but ]. . . If the thing destroyed, although it 
is part of the realty, has a value which can be 
measured and ascertained without reference to 
the value of the soil in which it stands, or out 
of which it grows, the recovery must be for 
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the value ofthe thing destroyed, and not for the 
difference in the value of the land before and 
after such destruction." 48 Ut. at 643-44. 
This rule has been restated and applied often in Utah 
cases, e.g. Bivans v. Utah Land, Water and Power 
Co., (1918) 53 Ut. 601, 174 Pac. 1126; Egelhoff v. 
Ogden City, ( 1928) 71 Ut. 511, 267 Pac. 1011; Tripp 
v. Bagley, (1929) 75 Ut. 42, 282 Pac. 1026; Ogden 
Livestock Shows v. Rice, ( 1945) 108 Ut. 228, 159 P.2d 
130, cf. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. 
llimonos, (10th Cir. 1951) 190 F.2d 1012. In Egelhoff 
v. Ogden City, supra, the court rejected the city's asser-
tion that damages to fixtures, considered to be real 
property, had to be measured by the decline in the 
market value of the property. The court applied the 
stated rule and found that the damage to cottages could 
be determined without reference to the property's 
value decline. Since this could be done, the court found 
that the correct measure of damages was the separately 
determinable amount. 
The application of this principle to the instant 
case requires that the damage to the plaintiff be meas-
ured by the net value of the ore improperly removed 
by the defendant minus the royalty received by the 
plaintiff on the ore. That ore had a proven value sepa-
rate and apart from the decline in value of the land. 
If the terms of the contract had been complied with, 
the ore would have been left to the plaintiff as its prop-
erty. To measure the damages to the plaintiff by the 
decline in value test is not only contrary to the Utah 
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rule. it is also contrary to the theory that governs the 
awarding of damages for a breach of a contract. In 
fact the defendant would be permitted to profit by 
breaching his contract because he would be allowed 
to keep the difference between the money he actually 
received for the ore and the damages awarded by the 
trial court. 
In the instant case, the breach consisted of mining 
and removing ore which was reserved by the contract 
to the plaintiff. Although it involved a tort, Elliff v. 
Tcd'on Drilling Co., (1948) 216 S.W.(2d) 824, it is 
useful in explaining the difference in the damage con-
cept where plaintiff's loss involved personalty as a 
separate and distinct value from the land. In this case 
the defendant's negligence had caused an off-set oil 
well to explode and catch fire. The fire cratered the 
well until it destroyed an oil well, two water wells, 
some cattle, grass, and the usefullness of the plaintiffs' 
land. The plaintiff sued for these damages and for 
destruction of gas and distillate from the hydrocarbon 
reservoir under their land. The trial court awarded 
damages for all the items claimed because under Texas 
law the owner of land has complete ownership of hydro-
carbons under it, not qualified, ~der the circumstances 
of this type case, by the law of capture. The Court 
of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court, 146 Tex. 
565, 210 S.W. 2d 553, but that court was in turn re-
Yersed by the Supreme Court of Texas, 210 S.W. 2d 
558 ( 1948) , which held that a landowner did have a 
right to damages as found by the trial court. How-
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ever, the case was remanded to the Court of Civil 
Appeals to consider, among other points, the measure 
of damages for the gas and distillate destroyed. J11 
this third proceeding the defendant maintained that 
the sole measure of damages was by application of the 
decline in market value test. Rejecting defendant's 
argument, the Court of Civil Appeals stated, 216 S.W. 
2d 824 ( 1948), at 830-31: 
"Under the Supreme Court's holding, we do 
not regard the measure of damages as set forth 
in 'First Point - B' (defendant's argument) as 
being the exclusive measure of damages applic-
able to a case of this character. The measure 
suggested is the one applicable to suits for in-
jury to real property. We have no doubt that 
in cases of injuries, such as that sustained by 
appellees here, an action for damages to real 
real property would lie and we so held in our 
former opinion. Damages recoverable in such 
action would be mesaured by the difference in 
the values of the property before and after the 
injury. \Ve also held in our former opinion that 
if appellees were to recover at all under the 
facts of this case, it must be as and for dam-
ages to real estate. This holding was reversed by 
the Supreme Court. That Court decided ap-
pellees were entitled to relief under another and 
additional theory, that is, that appellees could 
recover as and for the taking and destruction 
of gas and distillate which appellees owned or 
in which they had a property interest. The clif-
f erence of opinion between this court and the 
Supreme Court is neither narrow nor elusive, 
but is broad and fundamental. It goes to the 
concept of the nature of the action. The theory 
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of the action necessarily indicates to some extent 
the factors which must be considered in ascer-
taining damages. A proper standard for the 
measure of damages to real property is inappro-
priate for measuring damages for the destruc-
tion of personal property. It would be anomo-
lous to say that appellees could elect to recover 
as and for gas taken and destroyed rather than 
for injury to real property, but that having 
made such an election, their damages would 
nevertheless be governed by the same measure 
as that relating to damages to real property . 
.For all practical purposes, it would restrict the 
appellees to an action for injury to real property 
and nullify the Supreme Court's holding." 
Appellant submits that this reasoning should govern 
the instant case. 'i\That the plaintiff sought to recover 
iu its First Cause of Action in No. 2714 was damages 
for the ore taken by the defendant in violation of 
the contract terms. As was pointed out supra at page 20 
the Supreme Court of Utah approved plaintiff's 
theory in Egelhoff v. Ogden City. It should also be 
remembered that plaintiff and defendant signed the 
contract in which the primary subject matter was the 
ore. The ore, not the freehold, was the object of the 
parties' bargain. Damages should be measured in the 
terms contemplated by the parties. A contrary result 
would allow defendant a windfall profit by his breach 
of contract. This court held in the case of Sprague 
'1 1• Boyles Bros. Drillin,q Co., (1956) 4 Ut. 2d 344, 
294 P.2d 689, that where the parties make a contract 
with known facts and objects in mind, damages which 
are based upon these known facts, though not an actual 
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part of the contract between them, justify an award 
of damages in the light of the known facts and objec. 
tives. This principle is applicable to the instant case 
for the same reasons. The parties contemplated tht 
economics of mining in their negotiations. When de-
fendant stated that an adjustment was required tu 
mine under the earlier leases, adjustments were made 
in the royalty scale not in the provision restricting his 
right to remove pillars, prohibiting stoping, and limit-
ing the size of drifts (Tr. 194. cf. Exs. 12, 13, and 14 
with the 1963 lease). 
The instant case presents a factual situation where 
the application of the value differential rule is par-
ticularly inappropriate: First, because under the con-
trol-damage theory, damages are capable of separate 
measure and computation, whereas the N able theory 
damages are less precise, more speculative and less 
susceptible to definitive proof. They are, as the record 
here shows, only provable by expert opinion evidence. 
Secondly, because the value differential rule, if applied, 
would lead to a result that is unjust both in terms 
of the contractual agreement between the parties and 
in terms of the real loss to the plaintiff. Third, because 
the ore was, as was pointed out by the Texas Court, 
personalty, even though it would have been left at· 
tached to the land if there had been no wrongdoing 
by the defendant, and the awarding of damages under 
a theory which disregards the economic facts cannot 
compensate for the loss sustained by reason of the 
breach of contract. And finally, because the basic theory 
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11 f awarding damages, to put the plaintiff in that posi-
tion he would have occupied had there been no breach 
tJf contract, would be thwarted by the awarding of 
damages under a theory where the loss is manifestly 
insignificant by comparison with the performance 
plaintiff had a legal right to expect. 
Suppose a tenant of a farm executed an agreement 
with the land owner to the effect that the tenant had 
the right to remove the fruit from apple trees, but that 
the land owner retained the right to the fruit from the 
peach trees. In violation of the agreement, suppose 
the tenant removed the fruit from both of the trees. 
Applying Judge Ellet's theory of damages, the land 
owner could not recover damages based upon the value 
of the peaches less the cost of picking them. He would 
be limited to the speculative, meaningless and unreal-
istic difference between the value of the land before 
and after the peaches were removed. In the mining 
business, blocked out and inf erred ore has an economic 
value as clearly definable as unpicked peaches. Cer-
tainly, the analogy demonstrates that the application 
of State v. Noble is inapposite. 
The amount of damages to be awarded under the 
contract theory was proved with reasonable certainty. 
The defendant removed 3,031 tons more than the ore 
to which he was entitled under Paragraph 4 after 
making the deduction for the tonnage in the ceiling 
of Area No. 1 in accordance with Judge Ellett's sug-
gestion (Tr. 120-124, 137, Ex. 25, Tr. 393). The 
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mine map from which these calculations were made wa~ 
Yerified is substantially accurate by the defendant's ex. 
pert witness (Tr. 312). The settlement sheets show tht 
twerage grade of the ore to be .2384% U30s, and the 
purchase price per ton, without haulage, to be $19.35. 
Thus, the sales price of the ore unlawfully removed 
was $58,649.85 (Tr. 120-124, Exs. 7, 15). The highest 
figure in the record representing the cost of removal 
comes from the expert testimony of Samuel Arentz. 
His judgment was that the cost would be $6.75 per ton 
(Tr. 129). The haulage cost was paid by the mill 
directly as a separate item, and since it is not included 
in the receipts there is no purpose in including the 
figure in the cost of mining. Thus, the amount which 
the plaintiff could have reasonably made as profit on 
the ore should have been left in the Pete mine under 
the terms of the contract was $38,109.60. Reducing 
this amount by the royalties received, plaintiff's damage 
was $29,188.54. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
DETER:\IIN"E THAT PLAINTIFF WAS EN-
TITLED TO RECOVER SUBSTANTIAL 
DA.MAGE BASED UPON THE SECOND 
CAUSE OF ACTION IN NO. 2714. 
Prior to the lease with defendant the plaintiff 
possessed the right to recover all ores in the Pete 
Claims. Plaintiff surrendered to defendant only to 
the extent specifically defined in the contract. De· 
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fendant acquired a license to mine only those ores that 
fell within the provisions of Paragraph 4 of the lease. 
That which the plaintiff retained and the defendant 
received under the lease was specifically and explicitly 
go-rerned by Paragraph 4 of the lease, quoted supra 
at pp. 3, '1<. '¥hen the defendant violated this section, he 
trespassed upon property reserved by the lessor to 
itself. Defendant converted the ore reserved to the 
plaintiff. In fact, the evidence in the instant case con-
clusively established that the defendant knew that the 
ore was being extracted in violation of the lease and 
that this was being done willfully and knowingly. The 
breach of contract, the trespass, the conversion were 
all willful. The evidence also established that the pur-
pose of Paragraph 4, known to both parties, was to 
make the lease a development type lease whereby the 
defendant was permitted to perform exploratory and 
development operations upon the mine so long as all 
of the ore specifically reserved to the lessor was to be 
left for future mine operations. The defendant was 
entitled to only that ore uncovered in his exploratory 
and development operations. The record also shows 
that this clause was not only an operative part of the 
two leases between the parties governing the defend-
ant's operations prior to the one violated by the de-
fendant, it also shows that the defendant's attorneys 
had rejected it in its original form and had redrafted 
it into the form embodied in Paragraph 4. This con-
duct indicates a specific understanding of the clause, 
its purposes and its limitations. It also indicates that 
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it would be construed, if any construction were re. 
quired, against the drafter-defendant. 
In the case of Lewis v. Stewart, (1951) 203 Ok] 
349, 230 P.2d 455, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
decided a case analogous to the instant one. The parties 
had executed a lease which reserved the coal pillars to 
the lessor. Following a cave-in at a low level which 
prevented the lessee from further development of the 
mine, the lessee pulled all the pillars. The lessor 
brought suit against the lessee on the theory that the 
lessee had converted the coal from the pillars to its 
own use. The court held that the lessee had converted 
the coal and that lessor was entitled to recover on this 
theory despite the lessee's evidence to the effect that 
good mining practices required the removal of the 
pillars after a cave-in made further development of 
the mine impracticable. In fact, he testified that the 
only reason for leaving the pillars was to keep the mine 
open and workable, and since the cave-in prevented 
future work, there was no need, as well as it being 
good mining practice, to leave them in place. The 
court stated: 
"The prohibition in the lease is positive, and 
in effect amounted to a reservation of the coal 
in the pillars to the lessor. Whether or not any 
good purpose would be served by leaving them 
in the mine in its then condition was a question 
to be determined by the lessors, and not to the 
lessee." 230 P.2d at 459 (emphasis added). 
The court held that this conversion justified the plain-
tiffs in their termination of the lease. 
28 
Just as the violation of the lease in Lewis v. Stewart 
,rns held to be a conversion of minerals reserved to 
the lessor, the defendant has converted ores reserved 
to the plaintiff by violating the terms of the lease in 
the case currently before the court. Since the evidence 
mdicated that this ore had a substantial value, the trial 
court erred in not only failing to recognize the con-
version of the plaintiff's ore, it erred in not awarding 
damages in accordance with Utah law. 
In Fuller v. Mountain Sculpture, Inc., ( 1957) 
ti Ut. 2d 385, 314 P. 2d 842, this court held that where 
one went upon the claim (land) of another and re-
moved valuable minerals, and the trespasser converted 
minerals, the owner was entitled to recover. This court 
reversed the trial court which had refused to award 
damages and entered an order for compensatory dam-
ages in the amount established by the record. 'Vhen 
the defendant in the instant case mined ores reserved 
to the plaintiff, he was trespassing and converting 
just as was done by the defendant in Fuller v. Moun-
tain Sculpture case. The court there said: 
"This court has previously announced that 
when there is wrongful injury and substantial 
damage, just compensation should be awarded 
therefor." 6 Ut. 2d at 392. 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated: 
"The Utah courts have recognized that as a 
general rule the measure of damages for the 
conversion of property is the value of the prop-
erty at the time of conversion, plus interest. 
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Raycroft v. Adams, 82 Ut. 347, 24 P. 2d lllo 
Columbia Trust Co. v. Farmers' & l\:Ierchant.1: 
Bank, 82 Ut. 117, 22 P. 2d 164; Truitt v. Patten 
75 Ut. 567, 287 Pac. 175; 'Vestern Securitie: 
Co. v. Silyver King Consol. .Mining Co., 57 (t. 
88, 192 Pac. 664". Nephi Processing Plant 1.· 
Talbott, 247 F. 2d 771 (10th Cir. 1957) at 77j, 
This rule was restated and applied by this court in 
the more recent case of Lowe v. Rosenloff, ( 1961) 12 
Ut. 2d 190, 364 P. 2d 418. 
The State of Utah has enacted a statute which 
adopts a public policy that extends the common law 
concept of damages for conversion of ore. Sec. 40-1-12, 
U.C.A., 1953, provides: 
" ... any person who, wrongfully entering 
upon any mine or mining claim and carrying 
away ores therefrom, or wrongfully extractinr; 
and selling ores from any mine, having knowl-
edge of the existence of adverse claimants in any 
mine, and without notice to them, knowingly 
and willfully trespasses in or upon such mine 
or mining claim and extracts or sells ore there-
from shall be liable to the owners of such ore 
for three times the value thereof without any 
deductions either for labor bestowed or expenses 
incurred in removing, transporting, selling or 
preparing said ore, or its mineral content for 
market." (Emphasis added) . 
The statute is an explicit recognition of the policy 
in this state to inhibit the wrongful conversion of ore; 
to discourage trespass upon mining property; to pro-
tect owners of mines against the kind of conduct which 
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occurred in the instant case. It is to be noted that the 
statute requires trebling of the value of the ores taken 
with no credit allowed the trespasser for expenses 
incurred in removing the same. The policy behind this 
,tatute is that of requiring any disputed rights to 
minerals to be resolved by the courts of the state be-
fore, not after, they have been removed. The plaintiff 
submits that the trial court erred in failing to find 
from the facts that the defendant trespassed upon 
lauds and minerals reserved to the plaintiff, convert-
ing ores to his own use. The court also erred in failing 
to apply the strict sanctions designed to encourage 
compliance with the statute. 
The compiler of the 1953 Code has cited two cases ap-
plying this section of the code: Stephen Hays Estate, 
Inc. v. Togliatti, ( 1934) 85 Ut. 137, 38 P. 2d 1066; 
Utah Copper Co. v. Montana Bingham Consol. Min-
ing Co., (1927) 69 Ut. 423, 255 P. 672. Both the cases 
involved defendants who were extracting copper from 
water which passed over their lands. Neither case in-
volved a direct trespass, but since both cases considered 
conflicting rights to minerals in the absence of a blatant 
act, appellant submits that the holding of these cases 
reflects a state policy whereby the rights in minerals 
being protected were absolute and that conduct vio-
lating the provision need not be an old fashioned "claim 
jump" but could be a more subtle invasion of rights. 
The question involved in each of these cases was cer-
tainly more finely defined and less overt that the tres-
pass of defendant Nielson in the instant case. 
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Examination of the collateral references listed 
by the compiler under Sec. 40-1-12 leads to the 'Va~h­
ington cases construing a code provision governill11 
~ 
wrongful cutting of trees which is in language similar 
to our statute governing minerals. Blake v. Gra 11 1 
(1964) 65 'Vash. 2d 410, 397 P. 2d 843; Mullally r. 
Parks, ( 1948) 29 'V ash. 2d 899, 190 P. 2d 107; Lau_· . 
.wn v. Helmich, (1944) 20 'Vash. 2d 167, 146 P. ~d 
;)37. The statutes involved are R.C.,V.A. Secs. 64.-
12.040. The statutes are similar in that they are enacted 
by the peoples of the states to protect particular right\ 
in special resources of the state. In Mullally v. Parks. 
supra, the court trebled the damages where the de· 
fendant cut down the trees in question knowing that 
there was a dispute concerning their ownership. The 
court analyzed the application of the statute as fol-
lows: 
" ... they ... well illustrate the principle that 
where the trespass is without lawful authorit~. 
the tort feasor will be subject to treble the 
amount of damages assessed, unless it be shown 
that the trespass was casual or involuntary, or 
that the trespasser has probable cause to be-
lieve that the land on which the trespass was 
committed was his own." 190 P. 2d. 107, 110. 
The only difference between the Washington statutes 
and 40-1-12 UCA, other than subject matter, is that 
the 'Vashington statutes more carefully describe what 
will be considered to be a good faith trespass and, as 
such, will prevent the trebling of the damages. The 
policy of the statutes is the same: One proceeding 
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without lawful authority and with scienter is liable 
for treble damages. That rule applied to the facts of 
the instant case show that the defendant converted Lhe 
ores of the plaintiff was willfully and knowingly; he 
f;new them to be reserved to the plaintiff. 
The uncontradicted evidence is that the gross 
ralue of the ore wrongfully removed (i.e., without 
deduction for moving or hauling expense) was $73,-
:319.89. Of this amount $11,267.97 in value was re-
moYed after plaintiff gave notice to quit the premises. 
POINT III. 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
FOR THE UNLA\VFUL DETAINER OF 
THE PETE MINE BETWEEN APRIL 1, 1966 
~lND DECEMBER 16, 1966 AS A :MATTER OF 
LA\V. 
As is shown in the record and pointed out in Point 
I, the undisputed evidence shows the defendant vio-
lated the provision of the lease on the Pete claims as 
set forth in Paragraph 4 of that agreement. The last 
sentence of Paragraph 4 provides: 
"Failure to comply with the terms of this 
paragraph shall constitute justification to the 
lessor to cancel this lease without notice to les-
see. 
,, 
It is undisputed that on March 30, 1966, the defend-
ant was served with a notice of termination of the 
lease on the grounds that he had failed to comply 
33 
with the terms and prons1ons of the paragraph. De. 
mand was made upon him to quit the premises. (Ex. 
hibit B to Complaint in No. 2715). It is undisputed 
that defendant did not surrender the premises to tht 
plaintiff at any time prior to the last day of the trial. 
Sec. 78-36-3, U.C.A., 1953, provides: 
"A tenant of real property, for a term les) 
than life, is guilty of unlawful detainer: 
(I) when he continued in possession, in per-
son or by sub-tenant, of the property, or am 
part thereof, after the expiration of the ter~1 
for which it is let to him 
* * * * 
( 5) \Vhen he continues in possession, in per-
son or by subtenant, after a neglect or a fail-
ure to perform any condition or covenant of 
the lease or agreement under which the prop-
erty is held, other than those hereinbefore men· 
tioned, and after notice in writing requiring in 
the alternative the performance of such con-
ditions or covenant or the surrender of the prop· 
erty, served upon him, and, if there is a sub· 
tenant in actual occupation of the premises, also 
upon such subtenant, shall remain uncomplie<l 
with for five days after service thereof. \Vi thin 
three days after the service of the notice the 
tenant, or any subtenant in actual occupation 
of the premises, or any mortgagee of the term. 
or other persons interested in its continuance. 
may perform such condition or covenant and 
thereby save the lease from forfeiture; provided, 
that if the covenants and conditions of the lease 
violated b7; the lessee cannot afterwards be per· 
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formed, then no notice as last prescribed herein 
need be given." (Emphasis added). 
Cnder the terms of the lease upon the Pete property, 
defendant's lease terminated at the time he violated 
the provisions of Paragraph 4. This court held in 
Forrester v. Cook, ( 1930) 77 Ut. 137, 292 P. 206, 
that the parties may, by agreement, change the pro-
cedure for termination without rendering the statute 
any less applicable (77 Ut. at 153) and if this is done, 
the effect of the statute will be as though the statutory 
procedure were followed. Even if there were not so, 
however, no alternative notice would have been re-
quired under the "provided" clause of Sec. 78-36-3 
,5) C.C.A., 1953, since it would have been impossible 
t'or the defendant to have complied with the lease re-
llllirements, i.e., to replace the converted ore. It is 
apparent from the language of Paragraph 4 that the 
parties contemplated strict compliance with its terms. 
Whereas the lease contained a provision that two weeks' 
written notice should be given of other violations, a 
violation of the provisions of Paragraph 4 required 
no notice of default under the explicit language of the 
contract. (See Ex. B, para. 12). 
The unlawful detainer of defendant in the instant 
case was particularly flagrant. During the first ten 
days of the illegal detention, he unlawfully removed 
$11,269.97 worth of ore from the mine. Thereafter, 
he ref used to surrender the property to the plaintiff, 
thus preventing plaintiff from obtaining any economic 
return from its lawful property. At a hearing in 
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August, plaintiff offered to operate the mine anr. 
account to defendant if the plaintiff's claim to posse~ 
sion was determined to be unfounded. Def en<larn 
refused said offer under the dog-in-the-manger theor. 
that if he could not mine the property, then he wou]~ 
not permit anyone else to do so either. 
There is no question that forcible entry an<l de· 
tainer statutes apply to mineral leases. 107 A.L.R 
661; Foster v. Black, ( 1918) 20 Ariz. 64, 176 P. 845 
Economic return to an owner of mining property neces· 
sarily involves the removal of the minerals involved 
It is obvious that denial of this right necessarily cause, 
direct economic damages to the owner. This court ha., 
frequently held that damages for unlawful detainer 
are based on the fair and reasonable value of the right 
to property. This rationale is well illustrated in the 
case of Forrester v. Cook, supra, where the defendant 
maintained that the statute allowed damages only a~ 
distinct from rent, and, as the plaintiff's only loss was 
unpaid rent, the judgment should not be trebled. In 
analysis of the statute and concepts involved, the court 
stated: 
"'Vhile damages may not be restricted to 
the rental value, and may include more, yet 
the rental value during the unlawful withhold· 
ing of possession is the minimum of damages." 
The court rejected defendant's contention reasoning 
that the rent ref erred to (in what today would be Sec. 
78-36-10 governing damages and trebling of the same) 
in the statute would be rent due before commencement 
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uf the unlawful detainer, holding that once the unlaw-
ful withholding commenced, the fair rental value was 
;1 minimum damage, though there could be more, as 
the quoted sentence states. This analysis is applicable 
to the instant case where the denial to the plaintiff 
of its right to remove the ores in its property is a clear 
minimum of damage. As this is measured in its minimal 
amount by the average monthly royalties and rent 
reeeIYed by the plaintiff, this should be the minimum 
tlamage suffered. Such rentals, in the sum of $1,045.00 
per month should be awarded for each month of un-
lawful detainer. 
Then, as was first held in Eccles v. Union Pacific 
Curd Co., (1897) 15 Ut. 14, 48 Pac. 148, and reaffirmed 
ill Forrester v. Cook, supra, the sum found to be such 
damages must be trebled as the legally imposed penalty 
for the unlawful withholding of plaintiff's property, 
as the court said in Eccles v. Union Pacific Coal Co., 
15 Ut. at 19: 
"The judgments rendered are conclusive that 
the appellant was entitled to possession of the 
premises at the time of the alleged forcible de-
tainer; that such detainer was forcible; that the 
damages assessed were for the unlawful detainer 
alleged in the complaint. So that the only further 
question for us to consider is whether the dam-
ages found by the jury should have been trebled 
by the court. * * * Under this section (today 
Sec. 78-36-10) if possession is asked for, and 
the proof justifies it, judgment of restitution 
is to be awarded. If the proceedings are for 
unlawful detainer, after neglect or failure to 
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perform the conditions of the lease, or aftt 
default in payment of rent, judgment is to f1 
awarded which shall declare a forfeiture of th· 
lease * * * If judgment is rendered agaiust, 
defendant guilty of forcible entry or fonihJ, 
and unlawful detainer, judgment for three timl 
the amount of the damages assessed therefor 
and for the rent due, if any should be entered, 
and 15 Ut. at 21: 
"This action was properly brought under Sec 
3787 (today Sec. 78-36-3) which deals with tlJ, 
subject of forcible entry and detainer; and "'· 
see no ,·:did reason why the damages found for 
forcible detainer should not be trebled bv tht 
court, as provided by the act. Under the mithor 
ities there seems to be no escape from this re-
sult. The plaintiff is entitled to have the dam-
ages for forcible and unlawful detainer trebled 
by the court with costs." 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE 
A °"r ARD ED THE PLAINTIFF REASON· 
ABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES AS THIS 'VAS 
REQUIRED BY THE CONTRACT BE-
T,VEEN THE PARTIES. 
Though the lump sum award of the trial court 
makes it difficult to assess, the affidavit of the plain· 
tiff's attorney shows that the trial court failed to award 
reasonable attorney's fees to the plaintiff, although 
such an award \Vas required by the contract between 
the parties. In Slim Olson, Inc. v. TVinegar, (1952) 
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1.1·> Ct. 80, 246 P. 2d 608, this court held that where , __ 
a contract contains a clause requiring one to pay all 
costs of enforcing a contract, the clause would be en-
forced and the defendant required to pay the same. 
This rule was examined again in Pacific Coast Title 
[ns. Co. v. Hartford Acc. & Indemn. Co., (1958) 7 
n. 2d 377' 325 p. 2d 906, where the court found that 
1mder an indemnification bond suit, attorney's fees 
11ould have to be included as foreseeable expenses if 
the contractor failed to perform because attorney's 
fees "'ould be clearly involved in settling the disputes 
that would arise from said failure to perform. The 
general statement of the governing rule was made in 
JJlake v. Blake, (1966) 17 Ut. 2d. 369, 412 P. 2d 454: 
"As a general rule, attorney's fees are not 
recoverable as damages in either actions on con-
tract or in torts if there is no statutory or con-
tractual authority for such fees." 17 Ut. 2d at 
372. 
The contract between plaintiff and defendant pro-
Yided for the payment of attorneys' fees if suit was 
required to enforce it. Therefore, it falls clearly under 
the rules enunciated above, that is, the contract clause 
requiring payment of reasonable attorneys' fees in-
curred in enforcing the contract should be required 
of the defendant. Slim Olsen, Inc. v. Wingear, supra. 
It should be noted, however, that the fees thus 
claimed are for the enforcement of the contract as 
described in Point I of this brief, and not for the dam-
ages claimed for the unlawful detainer of plaintiff's 
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property, which damages are separate and distitit 
from those resulting from defendant's breach of n, 
lease agreement. Plaintiff recognizes that under Szi:w 
v. Salt Lake Real Estate & Investment Co., ( l9j,j 
a Ut. 2d 121, 279 P.2d 709, and Forrester v. Cool, 
supra, it is not entitled to attorneys' fees under th' 
unlawful detainer part of this action, and those attor 
neys' fees claimed are those which are incurred pur. 
suant to that part of this action under the contract 
damages theory. 
Plaintiff also respectfully submits that those at. 
torney's fees claimed by plaintiff, as described in the 
affidavit of plaintiff's attorney, were those fees in-
curred in attempting to enforce the contract and pre· 
paring the plaintiff's case for trial. As is stated in Z.i 
C.J.S., Damages, Sec. 50, P. 785: 
"As a general rule, contract provisions for tht 
allowance of attorney fees are construed to in· 
elude both trial and appellate fees." 
This rule is elaborated on in 52 A.L.R. 2d 860, where 
special attention is invited to Sec. 3 (b), pp. 866-67, 
governing the situation currently before the court in 
the instant case. Pursuant to this authority, plaintiff· 
appellant moves the court to award such additional 
fees as are reasonable for the prosecution of this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
After :Melvin Dalton and Jam es Menlove ex· 
amined the Pete mine in the Spring of 1966, they con· 
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fronted the defendant with the fact that his operations 
during the past year had substantially violated the 
proYisions of Paragraph 4 .. Mr. Nielson replied to the 
effect that Paragraph 4 should never have been in the 
]ease; that there was no court in the land that would 
Jpply it (Tr. 106). Perhaps more than any other single 
part of the evidence, this conversation characterizes 
the willful, flagrant nature of the defendant's viola-
tions. Notwithstanding the defendant's knowledge of 
and experience in the mining business, and notwith-
standing the fact that changes in Paragraph 4 were 
initially made at the defendant's request, he flaunted 
the terms of the paragraph in the facts of the plain-
tiff's officers and directors. The defendant admitted 
on cross examination that as late as 1965, he realized 
that he would have to have the consent of the plaintiff 
before he extracted ore in violation of the provisions 
of Paragraph 4 (Tr. 262-263). He admitted that he 
obtained no permission for taking any ore from the 
mine after the conversation with respect to the shooting 
of the ore from the ceiling in Area No. I (Tr. 262) . 
He testified that he realized that the plaintiff's owners 
"trusted to my judgment" (Tr. 263). 
The record in this case establishes clearly that 
plaintiff's reliance upon the defendant's integrity and 
honesty in mining the Pete mine was misplaced. On 
the breach of contract theory the plaintiff is entitled 
to be placed by this court in the position it would have 
enjoyed if the defendant had performed the contract. 
Failure to apply the correct measure of damages for 
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breach of contract requires reversal of the trial ju<l, 
with respect to the amount of damages on the contra, 
theory. It is submitted that the circumstances of ti. 
case justify the application of the provisions of sl 
tion 40-1-12 of the Utah Code, and to require an awar 
for damages upon the tort theory. Defendant shou 
also be held responsible for his unlawful detainer 
the property. 
Appellant submits that there is no occasion fo 
a new trial; no new evidence could be presented at 
ne\v trial which is not contained substantially in \\,, 
record in the instant case. The application of the propt 
legal principles to the undisputed facts justify tb, 
court in making a direct computation and award 
damages without any further proceeding in the Di~ 
trict Court. After a determination of the proper lega 
theories, if this court should come to the conclusio1 
that any uncertainty exists in appropriate amoun1 
of damages, it should appoint a referee for the soh 
purpose of determining the appropriate amounts rather 
than remitting the case for additional proceedings i11 
San Juan County. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2Gt11 
day of April, 1967. 
GEORGE M. McMILLAN 
and DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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